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Perceptual Bases
of
Visual Literacy
by
Paul Messaris

Image-Reality Discrepancies

these discrepancies would encompass
the following three broad areas:
(1) Discrepancies in Color and
Rlumination. For example, black-andwhite
photographs
contain
no
information about the hue of colors,
while unshaded outline drawings are
uninformative about both color and
illumination.
(2) Discrepancies in Depth Cues.
Because pictures which attempt to
represent three-dimensional scenes
must do so on a flat, two-dimensional
surface, all pictures Jack some of the
informational cues from which we infer
the third dimension in real-world
perception. (The nature of these cues
will be descnbed below.)
(3) Discrepancies in Shape. In many
kinds of pictures, across a broad range
of cultures and styles, the shapes of
pictured objects are conventionally
rendered very differently from the
shapes
of
their
real-world
counterparts. Stick figures and most
children's cartoons are good examples
of this process.

As Panofsky, Goodman, and other
writers (e.g., Gombrich, 1960; Snyder,
1980; Wartofsky, 1984) have pointed
out, many pictorial styles do indeed
entail sharp discrepancies between
image and reality. A minimal Jist of

In view of such discrepancies, it
may seem intuitively reasonable to
suppose that viewers who are not
familiar with a particular pictorial style
will be likely to have problems in
interpreting pictures in that style. In

Anyone with a scholarly interest in
visual literacy is likely to have come
across more than one story about
people from pre-industrial societies
who reportedly were unable to make
any sense of their first encounters with
photographs - even when those
photographs were of very familiar
subjects (e.g., see Deregowski, 1980;
Segall et al., 1966). Such accounts may
be seen as evidence in favor of the
proposition that the representational
conventions of photographs and other
kinds of pictures are largely or wholly
arbitrary, despite the fact that viewers
familiar with a particular pictorial style
may think of it as being "natural" or
"true to life." This view of pictures as
an arbitrary system of signification was
expressed as early as 1925 by the art
historian Erwin Panofsky, in a
celebrated essay on Renaissance
perspective, but its most influential
exponent has probably been the
philosopher Nelson Goodman (1976).
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Gombrich (1960) had articulated a
theoretical framework which turns out,
in retrospect, to have been a promising
way of approaching the research
findings. The basic hypothesis explored
by Gombrich was -that, even if a picture
does not look very much like the thing
it is meant to represent, it may
nonetheless provide to the eye and
brain informational cues which are
similar to those used in the perception
of the real world. For example,
perhaps the structural information
contained in a stick figure (the relative
length and position of the various body
parts) is meaningful by itself to any
perceiver (including someone who has
never seen such a picture before). In
other words, a crucial assumption
underlying this approach is that of
modularity: Perhaps our perceptual
apparatus operates on the basis of
discrete informational cues (about
structure, about depth, etc.), so that,
even if some of these cues are absent
from a particular visual display (e.g., a
picture), perception can proceed
unimpeded with regard to the other
parts of the display.

other words, it may seem that we have
here a good argument in support of the
conclusion that pictorial conventions
containing such discrepancies are
indeed · arbitrary,
as
Panofsky,
Goodman, and their followers have
claimed. As it happens, however, this
conclusion has been contradicted
repeatedly by a growing body of
empirical evidence.
Over the past thirty years, more
than a dozen studies have directly
investigated
how
inexperienced
viewers - including children, people
from societies without mass media, and
even animal subjects - respond to each
of the three types of pictorial
discrepancy listed above. Contrary to
what one might have expected -- and
contrary, also, to the outcomes of the
anecdotal reports mentioned earlier these studies have found that
inexperienced viewers are typically not
troubled by the first and third types of
discrepancy. In other words, they
typically do not find it difficult to
recognize the content of such things as
black-and-white photographs, outline
drawings, stick figures, and cartoons
(provided the objects represented in
these pictures are culturally familiar, of
course). Only the perception of depth
(i.e., the third dimension) in pictures is
likely to be problematic for
inexperienced viewers, although even
this difficulty is by no means inevitable.

This view of picture perception is
very different from the kind of
approach exemplified by Goodman
and his followers. It suggests that a
broad range of pictorial conventions
which may seem at first blush to be
arbitrary are actually derivatives of
real-world perceptual processes. It also
suggests, therefore, that the continuity
between
skills
of
pictorial
interpretation - which may be seen as
one of the building blocks of visual
literacy - and real-world perceptual
processes may be much greater than
someone like Goodman might imagine.

Explaining the Research
What could account for these
findings? As Hagen (1980) has pointed
out, investigators working in this area
of research tend to be concerned with
empirical details rather than with
theoretical expUcation or synthesis.
However, even before most of this
research
had
been conducted,

Although Gombrich's assumptions
appeared to fit in well with a variety of
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observations in perceptual psychology
as well as art history, he himself was
initially quite tentative about these
assumptions, because the state of
scientilic knowledge about visual
perception was too inconclusive at the
time to allow him to take a finn
position. His subsequent encounter
with the work of J.J. Gibson (1982) has
dispelled much of this tentativeness
(e.g., see Gombrich, 1984). However,
for a fuller assessment of the adequacy
of Gombrich's approach, we must turn
to more recent developments in
perceptual psychology. The past
decade has seen major advances in the
theory of vision, stemming most
notably from the work of the late
David Marr of M.I.T. (See Marr, 1982,
for the most accessible account of
Marr's basic theory.) These theoretical
advances have resulted in a significant
reconceptualization of the visual
process, with direct implications for the
issue which concerns us here, viz., the
degree of continuity between realworld (unmediated) perception and
the perception of pictures.
The Visual Process

The specific aspect of VISion
theory from which this connection
emerges has to do with the brain's
"translation" of the retinal image into a
mental representation of identifiable
objects in three-dimensional space.
Marr's model of this process comprises
three discrete steps. In the first step,
the brain scans the visual information
transmitted to it from the retina -- i.e.,
essentially a two-dimensional array of
color and light values -- in search of
discontinuities corresponding to the
outlines of objects or the edges of
surfaces. The end result of this stage of
the visual process is a mental
representation which Marr labels the

"primal sketch" and which can be
thought of as being equivalent to an
outJine drawing of the scene which the
eyes are looking at. All further mental
operations aimed at identifyii}g the
objects in the ·scene and inferring the
scene's three-dimensional properties
are conducted on the basis of this
outline representation.
In other words, here we have an
affirmation of Gombrich's assumption
of modularity in visual processing: The
ability to recognize objects and see
three-dimensionally without reference
to most details of light or color is
actually built into our real-world visual
apparatus. On the basis of this
principle it seems reasonable to
hypothesize
that
a
pictorially
inexperienced viewer should not in fact
be hampered by the absence of color
and/or shading in black-and-white
photographs, outline drawings, etc.,
and, as already noted, systematic
research - as opposed to anecdotal
evidence
has supported this
hypothesis (e.g., see Dusenbury, 1990;
Hochberg and Brooks, 1962; Spain,
1983; Zimmerman and Hochberg,
1970).

Depth Perception
Step two in Marr's model of the
visual process is concerned with
computing depth -- i.e., the third
dimension
in
the
outline
representation resulting from step one.
This computation makes use of several
types of information, or "depth cues,"
but for present purposes the following
four are the most relevant ones:
(1) Binocular Disparity. Because the
retinal image registered in the left eye
is slightly different from that of the
right eye (since the two eY.es' points of
view differ), and ~cause the
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magnitude of this difference in retinal
images is inversely related to our
distance from whatever it is we are
looking at, the brain can use this
difference in its computation of depth.
(2) Motion Parallax. Any change in the
relative position of the viewer vis-a-vis
the thing being viewe.d is accompanied
by a change in the retinal image of that
thing. Because the magnitude of the
retinal change is also inversely related
to distance (between viewer and thing
viewed), it too can serve as a depth
cue.
(3) Texture Gradients. Whenever we
look at a scene containing a regular
texture or pattern (e.g., a tiled floor, a
picket fence, railroad ties, or even such
naturally-occurring
patterns
as
uniform-sized pebbles on a beach), the
retinal image of that pattern will
increase in density as distance
increases. These variations in apparent
density can serve as informational cues
regarding the distance between the
observer and the various parts of the
scene she or he is looking at.
(4) Occlusion. When one object blocks
our view of another object, we know
that the former is closer to us than the
latter. This is a trivially obvious, but
nonetheless compelling, source of
information
about
the
threedimensional properties of the scene we
are looking at.

Object Identification

It should be readily apparent that
the first two of these depth cues cannot
possibly be incorporated into any
ordinary, non-holographic still picture
(although pairs of images viewed
through 3-D glasses or other
stereoscopic devices can of course
mimic the effect of binocular
disparity.) If our brain required the
simultaneous operation of all four cues
in order to compute depth, we would
be forced to conclude that the

The third and final step in the
visual process which concerns us here
entails the identification of the various
objects in the visual field. This part of
the process is not yet understood as
well as the previous two, but what is
known about it does permit us to say
that Gombrich appears to have been
correct in speculating that structure
alone -- without surface details -- might
be a sufficient basis for object
recognition.
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perception of depth in still images
must be an impossible task for
pictorially inexperienced viewers.
However, once again the principle of
modularity comes into play here. ·
As Marr and others have noted
(e.g., see Kubovy, 1986), there is good
reason to believe that these depth cues
can indeed operate independently of
one another. Consequently, if a
particular picture contains enough
information about depth in the form of
texture gradients and/or occlusion,
inexperienced viewers should not find
it difficult to see depth in that picture.
A picture meeting these criteria has
been tested in a study conducted in
New Guinea by Cook (1981), and the
results supported this assumption. On
the other hand, of course, when texture
gradients and occlusion are either
entirely absent from a picture or are
not sufficiently informative to generate
an adequate sense of threedimensional space, we should not be
surprised to find that inexperienced
viewers do not perceive depth in that
picture. This assumption, too, has been
confirmed
experimentally
(see
Hudson, 1967; also Hagen and
Johnson, 1977; Hamdi et al., 1982;
Mshelia and Lapidus, 1990).

As described by Marr, the brain's
activity at this stage in the visual
process consists of "reducing" the
outlin~s of objects into a more
elementary representational form in
which only the basic underlying
structure is retained, while many
incidental details are discarded. (In
other words, at this point the brain's
processing of visual information goes
beyond the outline format which was
the result of step one.) These more
basic structural representations are
then matched against a "dictionary" of
object structures in the brain's
memory. Thus, two different outlines
will lead to the same ultimate labelling
of an object so long as their underlying
structures match; and it is this feature
of real-world vision which is assumed
to account for our ability to recognize a
particular object in any number of
different circumstances (e.g., different
points of view, different levels of
illumination, etc.).

When it comes to specifically

pictorial variations in the appearance
of an object, then - e.g., the
transformations entailed in stick
figures, cartoons, sketches, etc. -Marr's theory suggests that a viewer's
ability to interpret such pictures may
be an extension of an everyday, realworld perceptual skill, rather than
something one has to learn through
previous experience with similar
pictures. It follows, therefore, that
inexperienced viewers should be able
to recognize the objects in such
pictures without much difficulty -- and,
as noted earlier, this has indeed been
found to be true in studies of this issue
(Cook, 1981; Kennedy and Ross,
1975).

Implicadons
We have seen that a broad variety
of pictorial styles which may seem,
intuitively, to entail major departures
from the appearance of the real world
- e.g., black-and-white photographs,
outline drawings, stick figures, cartoons
- do not appear to pose significant
interpretational obstacles to viewers
unfamiliar with those styles. This
observation, which has been confirmed
by a growing body of empirical
investigations, goes against the
implications of certain oft-cited
anecdotal accounts about first-time
viewers' responses to photographs and
other kinds of images. Does the
argument developed in this paper
imply that these anecdotal accounts
were
exaggerations
or
even
fabrications? Not necessarily. As
Deregowski et al. (1972) have shown in
a detailed study of this issue, it is quite
likely that the viewers' puzzlement
reported in these accounts was due to
lack of familiarity with the pictorial
media - typically, paper - rather than
being a response to the actual content
of the pictures. This view has been
supported by recent research in an
isolated rural area in Kenya (R.
Hobbs, personal
communication,
1992).
What are the broader implications
of the issues examined in this paper? It
has been argued that the skills required
for the interpretation of the
conventions of pictorial representation
may be, to a significant extent,
derivatives of real-world perceptual
processes, rather than arbitrary,
picture-specific mental habits. To the
extent that this is true, pictures may be
thought of as being, in that regard, a
more readily accessible mode of
communication than language, whose
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semantic and syntactic codes are
almost exclusively arbitrary. Does this
greater accessibility of pictorial
communication imply that the social
need for. visual literacy is Jess than the
need for verbal skills? H anything, the
contrary should be true. Precisely
because of their greater accessibiJity to
the untutored viewer, images as a
mode of communication may be
unmatched in their capacity for
manipulation and misinformation (see
Messaris, 1992; in press). The need for
visual literacy in its broadest sense -i.e., as reflective, critical awareness of
visual conventions and their uses
should be correspondingly acute.
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